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Political Party Systems and Their Influence on Policy Horizons in Malawi and Tanzania

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Abstract

Against the claim that democracy influences good policy due to competition, this paper argues that competition in young, fragmented democracies brings insecurity to ruling regimes and this influences the introduction and implementation of short-term policies aimed at getting votes. The argument is in tune with Niles's (1999) claim made on social protection programmes that democracies with stable party systems and dominant party systems are likely to choose more progressive policies than non-elected systems and democracies with fragmented party systems. The study utilized a comparative case study approach involving Malawi and Tanzania. Mostly qualitative research design was employed and both primary and secondary data collection methods were utilized supplemented by document analysis and key informant interviews. The data was analysed using content analysis. Findings from the study confirm that Malawi's party system is characterized by high fragmentation (substantial number of parties) and low ideological polarization. Higher electoral competition within this fragmented system brings insecurity to the ruling regimes and influences preference for short-term policies aimed at getting votes easily. Party domination in Tanzania, influenced by strong leadership and grounded ideology, has brought security to the ruling regime to formulate and implement policies with longer-term horizons and minimal distraction from pluralist forces. Borrowing from Tanzania's stable policy environment, Malawi's political system needs to reshape incentives for the institutionalization of political parties. Such incentives would include strengthening the regulation of parties to limit entry and implementation of state funding for parties that obtain a substantive portion of the national vote.

Keywords: Dominant party systems, Fragmented party systems, mandate, ideology, development frameworks, subsidies

1.0 Introduction

Against the claim that democracy influences good policy due to competition, this article argues that competition in young, fragmented democracies brings insecurity to ruling regimes and this influences the introduction and implementation of short-term policies aimed at getting votes. The argument is in tune with Niles's (1999) claim made on social protection programmes that democracies with stable party systems and elected authoritarian or dominant party systems are likely to choose more progressive policies than do non-elected systems and democracies with fragmented party systems. Policies on subsidies and social cash transfers are often cited as examples of nonprogressive and short-term policies, especially in the sub-Saharan region.

In democracies, good policy is said to be enhanced by electoral competition. An institutional focus on democracy assumes that constraints on politicians and elites, such as electoral accountability, shape the incentives for good policymaking because they discipline incumbent politicians (Besley & Case, 1995). Malawi has conducted elections that have been held as more competitive than its neighbour Tanzania, which has seen one party (CCM) dominating all elections since independence. Based on the assumption of democracy above, Malawi's leaders should practice more accountability than Tanzania. This article illustrates that Malawi's party system cannot be called "competitive" in the normal sense applied to other Western democracies. While the existence of large numbers of parties encourages party competition, competitive systems are not homogenous as some will be stable, and others are fragmented or fluid (Salih & Nordlund, 2007). Stable systems are characterized by a dwindling number of parties or low fragmentation with parties being grounded on ideologies. The opposite characteristics make a party system fluid or fragmented (Avcu, 2013; Sartori, 1976; Linz & Stepan, 1978, p. 24-27). The latter fits the party system in Malawi and this article will illustrate this characteristic.

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At elections, parties compete by selling their proposed policies through manifestos. Government systems have at the same time been encouraged to draw medium to longer-term policies and plans in an attempt to sustain economic development in Africa. The Africa Conference in 1990 recognized that for Africa to develop, there was a need for long-term planning must be endogenous, responding to national needs and aspirations (Global Coalition for Africa, 1992). Marriage between long-term planning and manifesto or mandate policies has been a concern in many polities and this article attempts to assess the influence of party systems in Malawi and Tanzania on policy horizons by examining how well they synchronize the two types of policies.

There are strong links between the introduction of multiparty politics in Africa and the adoption and scale-up of subsidy and social support policies. Subsidy policies were avoided by African governments amid the extreme poverty levels when the SAPs resulted in hardships on livelihoods. Their argument was based on the fear that such welfare arrangements create dependency, undermine traditional informal support mechanisms, and divert scarce public resources that could be better invested in productive sectors like agriculture or industry (Devereux, 2006). The several safety net and social support programmes that existed to address various risks affecting vulnerable groups were, therefore, mostly initiated and funded by external actors like donors and international NGOs before multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. These African governments have abandoned their earlier stand in the past three decades and increased subsidy programmes. Rao (1984) suggests that subsidy programmes have been implemented in the context of democracy because of electoral competition. Cook and Kabeer (2009) argue that political parties increasingly vie for power, and therefore policy promises on such areas as subsidy programmes are top on their policy agenda. While competition in democracy is supposed to improve policy, the adoption and scale-up of subsidy policies begs the question as to whether the intention or consequence of the recent events is developmental or not.

1.1. Case selection

Tanzania presents a good comparative case to Malawi as these bordering countries have had similar challenges, though the issue of hunger has featured higher in Malawi. Both countries have similar histories of the slave trade and colonialism, and their transitions have come at similar periods; independence in the early 1960s and multiparty democracy in early 1990s. The significant difference between these two countries is the ideological path taken by each country after gaining independence.

Tanzania adopted a socialist system of government and Malawi maintained much of the capitalistic elements of the colonial system of government after independence. The transition into the multiparty system in the early 1990s resulted in different party systems whereby Tanzania has a clear dominant party system with Malawi maintaining a more competitive party regime.

Similarities in the geographical and historical backgrounds of the two neighboring countries make them a good case for comparison. Differing party systems that followed the transition to a multiparty system however connect the discourse to Nile's argument on policy determinants. Both countries have subsidy programmes with variations in areas that include agriculture input, housing subsidies, and lately social cash transfers. An examination of how these two countries have adopted and implemented various subsidy programmes aims at assessing Nile's assumptions on relating party systems and policy horizons against the broader claim that competition enhances good policy.

1.2. Objectives of this Article

The main objective of this article is to investigate how political party systems influence policy horizons in Malawi and Tanzania. Policy horizons should be understood in this article in terms of short- and long-term dimensions. Specific objectives include the following: the article attempts to illustrate that Malawi's party system is fragmented rather than a stable competitive system; the article analyses how Malawi and Tanzania synchronize manifesto and medium to longer-term development strategies and the article also examines the adoption and implementation of subsidy and social protection policies as a demonstration of leanings on policy preferences in the two polities.

1.3. Significance to The Body of Knowledge

Beyond the assumption that competition improves policy in democracies, this study reveals that this varies among party systems with dominant parties producing more stable and longer horizon policies than fragmented party systems. This study therefore extends Nile's (1999) argument that policy horizons are influenced by political party regimes in the social protection sector to include the influence of the same in the introduction and implementation of other shorter-term policies such as subsidies.

The study reveals that party domination and fragmentation are not determined by fiat but result from

longer-term institutional transformation influenced by political economy factors, including ideas, agency, and transitions. The study, therefore confirms Bratton and Van Walle's (1994) predictions on regimes and transitions whereby personal dictatorships transition into fragmented and fluid party systems and party domination results from competitive one-party systems.

The study also highlights the competing interests behind mandate policies and development frameworks' implementation. Adherence to the latter diminishes in the more fragmented party system of Malawi than in Tanzania.

2.0 Review of Literature

2.1. Theoretical Perspective

To understand the influence party systems, have on policy and the nature of policies regimes will adopt we must establish exactly what party systems the polities understudy have adopted over time. Theories on party systems are employed to aid this segment. Next, the article examines the policy-making structures and how they collaborate to achieve better policy. Literature on party systems, mandate policies, and development frameworks are analyzed. The article also looks at the resultant policies in both polities. Literature on subsidy policies is reviewed as subsidy policies have been identified as one of the popular policies dominating party manifestos.

2.1.1. Transitional Theories

To understand the party systems of the two countries, an analysis of the path through which the two countries traveled to reach their current state is deemed necessary. Both Malawi and Tanzania underwent transitions to multipartyism within the same period the third wave of democratic transitions was sweeping across Africa including Sub-Saharan countries. Though these circumstances affected both countries, the transition processes these two countries underwent were different. The strength of institutions over time gets tested during transitions and Bratton and Van de Walle's (1994) predictions on characteristics of a polity are based on the behaviour of regimes before the multiparty transitions in the 1990s. Malawi's authoritarian regime provided fewer channels for negotiating rules and with the absence of the culture of contestation and participation transition occurred along with disruption of institutions -rapture-resulting in the 'rapid passage of power into the hands of the opposition' (Gillespie, 1990, p. 45). The resulting democracy was competitive but the weakness of institutions including political parties resulted in a

fragmented or fluid system characterized by a substantial number of parties that are not differentiated by distinct ideologies. Tanzania on the other hand being a competitive one-party system was more inclusionary and allowed limited competition within the party (Lofchie, 2014). When they saw change coming, incumbent leaders flowed with the wind and controlled the pace of change securing themselves in the echelons of power. As a typical example of the continuity theory, disruption to institutions was much less. Party dominance of CCM was strengthened.

2.1.2. Institutions

In the development discourse, key roles and the legitimacy of the state have been shaped by the high degree of agreements about institutional arrangements (rules of the game) about how decisions are made (Leftwich, 2007). According to North (1990), institutions constitute the historically embedded 'rules of the game' within a given society. Institutions are useful in guiding the development path. They provide guidance on what to expect and what is permitted, and development will be expected where capable political institutions, which can give substance to public interests, exist (Huntington, 1965). The structure can shape institutions the polity will have, and institutions can also shape structures over time. Modernity introduces new formal structures and institutions that must be fitted within existing traditional structures and norms. Interaction between the formal and existing norms determines the mix of institutions that may provide stability or not to the polity and, therefore, how policy formulated is accepted or rejected or even if outcomes of the policy are considered developmental or 'un-developmental' (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). The underdevelopment or stagnation in young democracies has been attributed to weak institutions. In analyzing party systems and policies associated with them it is inevitable to touch on the subject of institutions and party systems, policies parties produce as well as development frameworks developed to guide longer-term growth are all associated with institutions.

2.1.3. Party Systems

A comparative analysis of party systems in Malawi and Tanzania is conducted to examine the possible influence these systems may have on policy horizons. This article utilized Sartori's dominance and competitiveness criteria to establish the type of party systems these countries have. A review of the literature reveals that changing ruling parties at elections makes the system competitive, whereas party domination is marked by a lack of changes where the ruling party remains the same despite elections

being regularly conducted. While the existence of large numbers of parties encourages party competition, competitive systems are not homogenous as some will be stable, and others are fragmented or fluid (Salih & Nordlund, 2007). Stable systems are characterized by a dwindling number of parties or low fragmentation with parties being grounded on ideologies. A system with a high number of parties competing at elections and where the parties are not distinct on ideologies is said to be fragmented (Avcu, 2013; Sartori, 1976; Linz & Stepan, 1978, p. 24-27). Tanzania has been referred to as a dominant party system for its maintenance of the CCM as the ruling party since independence. Malawi on the other hand has been called a competitive party system due to relative uncertainty on winners at elections. The first part of the 'findings' section will seek to demonstrate that Malawi's competitive system has characteristics of a fragmented party system.

2.1.4. Mandate Theory Amidst Development Frameworks

This article discusses how the need to win votes through mandate policies in electoral democracies must be matched with the need to sustain development through medium and long-term plans and strategies. The article uses this dimension to compare the influences of party systems on policy horizons in these polities. The extent to which a developing democracy like Malawi and Tanzania will achieve this balance determines the development path of the country.

The adoption of multi-party democracy in the early 1990s brought the need for ruling elites to seek a mandate from the public through competitive elections, meaning that elites compete in selling their potential policies to the public. Proposed policies that are attractive enough will win the concerned parties the mandate to rule. This is what describes the mandate theory. Policies culminating from party manifestos are also referred to as mandate policies.

During the period, many Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries were adopting multi-party systems of government, and different developments within the economic development arena saw the popularization of long-term planning in many countries, including the SSA. Following the failure to sustain economic development in Africa, The Africa Conference in 1990 recognized that for Africa to develop, there was a need for long-term planning that must be endogenous, responding to national needs and aspirations (Global Coalition for Africa, 1992). The stress in the 'New' national development planning movement has been on wide participation of citizens in

the planning process. While the participation element is in tune with the principles of democracy, the marriage between long-term planning and mandate policies has raised many concerns, and policy planning horizons have been affected, threatening the aspirations for sustainable development ((Edigheji, 2005). The effectiveness of party systems in employing policy for development can be tested by analysing how they effectively manage mandate policies with the more technocratic medium to long-term policies and strategies to avoid getting their countries trapped in short-term attractions.

Economic development and change are a function of many variables including political leadership which is often considered one of the key factors. Political decisions shape the actions and omissions of economic actors (Ngowi, 2009). Agential factors have played a key role in shaping the policy environment in Malawi and Tanzania since the two countries gained independence. The first presidents of the two polities had more space to propose and adopt the type of government they wanted, and the consequences thereof are still affecting the two polities. The post-independence era was marked by relatively favourable space for government-dominated policy and the two governments were able to propose their medium-term plans and implement them without much interference from opposing voices. Policy space began to shrink during the implementation of the SAPs. Later, policy would have to be compromised within a more competitive and pluralistic environment. The leaders in the multiparty era have therefore had mixed fortunes with displays of brilliance at times and less so oftentimes.

2.1.5. Democracy and Subsidy Policies

Democracy advocates claim that the system facilitates the realization of economic growth through several means including strengthening institutions of accountability and redistribution in favour of social provisions in more unequal societies (Vollmer & Ziegler, 2009). A rather radical view has been presented by Galenson and Schweinitz, (1959) who blame democracy itself for the failure of development as they claim that it "unleashes pressures for immediate consumption, which occurs at the cost of investment, hence of growth". This view has been strongly echoed by Rao (1984, p. 75), Huntington (1968), and Huntington and Dominguez (1975), who illustrate further by stating that economic development requires huge investments in personnel and materials, implying cuts in current consumption that bring pain at the low levels of living. According to this school of thought, democracies, owing to their need to cater to a broad electoral base, will have more extensive social

policy commitments. As broadly distributed social spending including subsidies is known for being welfare-enhancing, the argument further states that such policies may not be developmental. Subsidies have courted controversy at both domestic and international levels. Within the field of economics, conflicting views often come up on the issue of subsidy. By providing resources to the poor and underprivileged, where well-designed subsidies bring about a more equitable distribution of economic well-being than that generated by an ‘unfettered free-market economy,’ and through correction of failures of the market mechanism to create an efficient allocation of goods and services (Triest, 2009). While Keynesian protagonists see subsidies as a solution to market imperfections, market economists’ predominant view is that an activity worth undertaking must meet the market test: i.e., the existence of sufficient demand for the private sector to profitably engage in the activity. To this school of thought, the need for a subsidy is a signal that the activity fails the market test, and so may not be worthwhile (Triest, 2009). Phang (2011) supports this school of thought by emphasizing the inefficiency and

ineffectiveness of subsidies especially those run by the Government. Okun (1975) likens the inefficiencies in the redistribution of public resources to a leaky bucket where some water is lost on the way while some get delivered to the destination (i.e., redistribution still does occur).

2.2. Conceptual Framework

Implications of party regimes on policy are elaborated by the study done by Niles (1999) on social protection whose findings, highlight connections between regime types and policy horizons. Although this study targeted social protection, the results can be applied to incentives for driving the adoption of subsidy programmes under different party regimes. Niles's (1999) matrix combines some elements of historical institutionalism and political economy analysis to predict the trends policymaking will likely display under different regime types. The figure below is an illustration of possible elements shaping policy and the likelihood of adoption of subsidy policies under different political regimes.




Figure 1: Model on Policy Determinants

Adopted from Niles (1999) with modification by the author.

From the figure above, fragmented or fluid party systems are likely to adopt shorter time horizon policies like those on subsidies. A large number of competing parties will focus on appealing to narrow constituencies. The provision of public goods is not of much priority, faced with the need to push for election or re-election. Elected authoritarian and dominant party systems tend to adopt longer time horizons as the security of the tenure of leaders is more assured. They seek to appeal to the voters rather than force them, hence, some temporary subsidies and safety nets can be implemented to a limit as a matter of maintaining political legitimacy and social control. The level of adoption is medium. Politicians in stable multiparty democracies can work with longer time policy horizons and have a medium level of subsidy adoption. They need to appeal to broad constituencies to remain in power and will, therefore, place efforts on implementing policies that provide public goods rather than targeted merit goods. Stable and competitive party systems will often be associated with polities where information flow between governments and voters is not an issue.

3.0 Methodology

The study utilized a comparative case study approach involving Malawi and Tanzania. A qualitative research design was mostly employed and both primary and secondary data collection methods were utilized. Empirical data was collected mainly between January 2018 and June 2020 in Malawi and Tanzania. Desk research involved constitutions, manifestos, and development frameworks, among others. The collection of primary data involved key Informant Interviews using semi-structured interviews.

This study used purposive (or selective) sampling which according to Patton (1990) and Schatzman and Strauss (1973), is strong in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study whereby one can learn a great deal about issues of vital importance. Political parties were targeted due to the role they play in proposing policies through manifestos. DPP and MCP for Malawi and CCM and CHADEMA in Tanzania were selected as these have been dominant in the two polities for the past four electoral cycles. Interviews were also conducted with Government ministries, and constitutional bodies, due to the relevance of these in the policy infrastructure. Offices of the President and Cabinet, Ministries of Finance and economic planning were central to this analysis, and policy experts.

The data was analysed using content analysis. A combination of Cohen et al (ibid) seven-step data analysis sequence and Atkinson's (2002) Four-step case study data analysis guided the analysis. This involved preparing the data for analysis by categorising the data, analysing the data, and validating it.

The use of different data sources and methods of data collection ensured that the data collected was more credible. The multiple sources of evidence were related to each other and woven into the narrative to represent what Yin (2014) calls a 'chain of evidence'. The study dedicated much time to issues of context, Malawi, and Tanzania, within which policies are formulated, monitoring stability within those comparative cases. The study kept an audit trail of all steps taken from the beginning to the end of the research to ensure transparency and therefore assure that findings can be confirmable and dependable.

4.0 Findings

Findings are presented in three main parts: First is to confirm the party systems dominant in the two polities of Malawi and Tanzania, second, a comparison of how the two-party systems marry the mandate policies with longer-term development strategies and third is the comparison of how resultant policies are proposed and adopted by these two systems. The idea of presenting findings through these steps assists in assessing how the two-party systems in these polities embrace and potentially sustain short- and longer-term policies.

4.1. Party Systems in Malawi and Tanzania

This section seeks to confirm that Tanzania has a dominant party system and demonstrate that Malawi's competitive system has characteristics of a fragmented party system. As presented in the literature review section above, this is done by analyzing the following factors: (i) the number of parties competing at elections (ii) changes of ruling parties as well as (iii) the strength of ideological bases of parties in the two countries.

4.1.1. Number of Parties

Malawi has many parties, and the actual number could not be authoritatively verified. Some parties appear on paper while on the ground they have no single structure. Other parties were dismantled as their leaders joined more prominent parties but have not been deregistered. The Centre for Multiparty Democracy, a forum that brings together Malawi's political parties to discuss issues pertaining to their strengthening, was not so sure about the numbers either:

"Malawi has over fifty-five registered political parties but one cannot be sure of the actual number as some have been inactive since registration." Centre for Multiparty Democracy respondent, 8 January 2021

In Malawi's return to the multiparty system of government in 1994, Muluzi of the United Democratic Front (UDF) won 47.3% of the votes against 33.6% and 18.6% for Dr. Banda of Malawi Congress Party (MCP)

and Chihana of Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) respectively. Muluzi's party United Democratic Front (UDF) got eighty-five seats, Malawi Congress Party (MCP) fifty-six, and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), 36. No party or presidential candidate in the democratic

era scored more than 50% of the total vote/seats except Bingu Wa Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2009 elections. The following table shows the distribution of seats in Malawi's parliament from the 1994 elections to 2019.

Table 1: Distribution of Seats in the Malawi Parliament from 1994 to 2019

PARTY	MCP	DPP	UDF	PP	UTM	MPP	AFORD	RP	NDA	MAFUNDE	CCF	PPM	PETRA	MCODE	CONU	INDEPENDENTS	TOTAL
1994	56		85				36										177
1999	66		93				29									4	192
2004	57		49				6	15	9			6	1	3	1	40	187
2009	27	113	17			1	1			1						33	193
2014	48	50	14	26			1				1					52	192
2019	55	62	10	5	4		1									55	192

Source: <http://archive.ipu.org> and mec.org.mw

While UDF obtained the biggest number of seats in parliament in the first two elections, MCP has always been the toughest competitor, and in 2004 it obtained a bigger number of seats than UDF which produced the president.

The system is so open that parties can come from nowhere and easily obtain seats in parliament. DPP, formed in 2005, won the majority of seats in the legislature in 2009 (113). According to the matrix above, 2004 saw the highest number of parties represented in parliament (9) parties and 2019 saw fifty-five independent members making it to parliament. These members had previously competed in primary elections within their parties and failed. Competing against their parties shows how the parties as 'gatekeepers' can be challenged. Upon winning the elections, such candidates are usually welcomed back to their parties as MPs. John Bande, an MP of Blantyre City East, for instance, having lost in primaries for DPP won parliamentary elections in

2019 as an independent candidate but returned to the party in 2020. (reported by Duncan Mlanjira, Nyasatimes, May 20, 2020).

Unlike Malawi, Tanzania retained Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) as a ruling party during the return to multiparty politics in the 1990s. The country has remained with the dominant party system to date (Whitehead, 2009). The CCM dominance in the Tanzanian parliament has ranged between 80 to 88% before it came down to 75% in 2015 following Kikwete's regime and rose again to 96% in 2020 during Magufuli's time. As regards the number of parties competing in elections, the table below shows that seven (7) parties have participated in the elections between 1995 and 2020. However, real competition has been between three parties, CCM, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), and Civic United Front (CUF). The following trend summarizes the above contention.

Table 2: Parliamentary Seats Obtained by Parties at Elections in Tanzania

Party	CCM	CHADEMA	NCCR-Mageuzi	CUF	UDP	TLP	ACT Wazalendo	Others
1995	186	16	3	24	3			
2000	202	4	1	17	3	4		
2005	206	5		19	1	1		
2010	186	23	4	24	1	1		
2015	189	34		32		1	1	
2020	225	1		3			4	

Source: EISA Database, 2020

4.1.2. Changes of ruling parties

Malawi is one of the few Southern African states that did not retain the ruling party after adopting a multiparty system in the 90s. Malawi Congress Party (MCP), which had ruled since independence, lost to United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 1994 elections. UDF ruled for two five-year terms and internal divisions in the third term saw the new president, Bingu Wa Mutharika, abandon the party that put him in office and form his own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The brief history of party dominance in Malawi seems to have ended with this ‘accidental’ change of ruling parties.

However, when one speaks about party domination in terms of not losing elections, UDF did not at this moment lose elections, meaning that, had the president not abandoned his party, they might have been ruling till stronger opposition overcame them later. A similar change occurred in 2012. Following the death of Bingu of DPP, Joyce Banda, the vice president took over and ruled under the Peoples’ Party (PP) policies. PP had been formed as a splinter of DPP after Bingu had sidelined Joyce Banda in government business. In 2014, the DPP returned to the ruling status. They were later dislodged by the MCP in 2020 fresh elections after the initial 2019 elections were declared invalid By the High Court sitting as a constitutional court and later upheld by the Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal upon appeal. No party dominates the government for longer periods than two terms.

Party domination in Tanzania has been very apparent as the ruling CCM has won all elections since independence. Table 4.2 above shows party domination clearly as no party comes closer to CCM in terms of parliamentary seats won. One civil servant in Dodoma (November 2019) attributed this to the fact that institutional structures of the Liberation Party CCM from the central to the ‘10-cell party units’ at the village level, have assisted in strengthening control and cohesion within the party.

4.1.3. Strength of ideological bases of parties

The literature above also presents the distinction of party systems based on ideological distance between parties in a polity. During its one-party rule, the Malawi Congress Party was highly opposed to socialism and followed what could mostly be identified as a capitalistic ideology (Kayuni, 2011). Two parties, United Democratic Front (UDF) and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) that came as pressure groups around 1991 found the political ground dominated by Western ideas influenced by the Bretton Wood Institutions, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPS). Though AFORD’s leader Chihana came from the workers’ union background, having held the post of Secretary-General for the Southern African Trade Union Coordinating Council (Meinhardt & Patel, 2003), which mostly influenced his AFORD’s socialist ideology, he also looked for western financial assistance and the socialistic taste of his party became barely audible.

When UDF won the 1994 elections it went full throttle implementing privatization and other SAPs. Although Mpesi (2011, p. 40) found significant issues of saliency in two parties, MCP and UDF, before the 2009 elections, he admits that parties are aware that there are few ideology voters in Malawi and as rational entities driven by office-seeking instincts, they focus on 'avenues which the party thinks will push the voters on (their) side'. Interviews with central executive members of Malawi's two leading parties had MCP claiming that it is a:

...conservative agro-based party and we aim to ensure farmers are organized and have markets for their products. (Lilongwe, January 2018)

The DPP representative also had the following claim on their philosophy:

We are a people-centered party, and we believe in hard work, integrity, and patriotism.

Lilongwe, September 2018

DPP respondent, however, admitted that although they have tentative philosophies that assist run their party, there is no particular ideology that clearly identifies their policy stand. Even though the MCP member cited the value associated with his party, he admitted that the membership was not aware of the said ideology. In their 2019 manifestos, MCP was consistent in expressing their desire to follow the democratic developmental state model:

The MCP believes that Malawi's fortunes can dramatically turn around within the framework of a capable democratic developmental state. MCP envisions a very activist and interventionist role for the government in driving growth and development.

Malawi Congress Party Manifesto 2019-2024: P 23

The DPP's manifesto on the other hand was not noticeably clear and consistent. The newspaper insert that summarized key issues from party manifestos for the 2019 elections states clearly the DPP's key principles as follows:

The DPP believes in a lean but efficient government with a larger private sector capable of stimulating economic growth and development.

Centre for Multiparty Democracy, 2019

The actual manifesto for the 2019 elections is not as succinct in stating the party's position.

Tanzania has followed a different ideological path from independence. As a liberation party, the CCM party in Tanzania was able to maximize the political allegiances from rural communities utilizing emancipation ideologies to cement their hold on power. The strengthening of party dominance in Tanzania is attributed to the socialist ideology spearheaded by Nyerere's leadership. According to one respondent, CCM has always reflected the socialistic characteristics as he says:

It utilizes ideological statements from its constitution like 'Socialism and Self-Reliance is the only way to build a society of equal and free individuals' to train its youth and women wings and anchor them in that ideology. These are systematised training.

Former civil servant, Dar es Salam, July 2018

Although one respondent observes that the changing world order has diluted these ideologies, they still persist in the CCM policy documents and propaganda. MCP as a liberation movement was also able to maximize the political allegiances from rural communities, however, management of transitions led to the party's loss of elections and turning into an opposition party furthermore staying out of power for 26 years meant that their hold on the local structures could not be sustained.

The opposition in Tanzania does not have the privilege of distinct ideologies. They are caught in between socialism and free market ideals but are afraid of associating themselves with extreme liberal ideals for fear of losing people who have always had the closer influence of socialism. CHADEMA's values statement in the 2006 constitution talks about creating and sustaining a free-market economy that will 'respect and protect the rights and property of the people, free trade...' CHADEMA (Constitution 2006, p. 19). Twelve years later the party produced a policy document where the statement of the Secretary-General states that the party believes in the principle of the 'Social Market Economy' while providing a 'social welfare component' (CHADEMA, 2018, p.14). Although there appear to be shifts in positions between a free market economy to a more socially oriented principle, the party is mostly identified with free market economy ideals. This makes it clearly different from CCM's ideological leaning.

4.2. Mandate Policies and Development Planning: A Comparative View

The following section analyses the interaction of mandate policies and development frameworks in Malawi and Tanzania through an analysis of structures and processes that aid the formulation of these policies as well as the

agential support that has been instrumental in building these structures. The idea is to assess how effectively the fragmented system in Malawi and the dominant party system in Tanzania have managed the two types of policy to support each other for better policy direction.

4.2.1. Formulation Processes

Similarities between Tanzania and Malawi in their development frameworks include processes followed to produce these frameworks. During these processes, established procedures are followed, and as many stakeholders as possible are involved so to ensure inclusiveness and hence buy-in from the populace for better implementation. On the contrary, processes for producing mandate policies in most of the parties in the two countries are inadequate and parties have complained of lack of resources and weak structures to reach out to the population (Mpesi, 2011; Maiyo, 2008).

Tanzania's CCM is the only party that seems to be aided by its own 10-cell structures to aggregate perspectives, preferences, and interests from its supporters that enable the party to compile manifestos. (Norman, 2009), The rest of the parties in Tanzania do not have this privilege and in Malawi, both ruling, and opposition parties have weak structures at the grassroots. MCP had better structures but the decades they spent in the opposition have deprived them of resources to maintain their structures. The table below shows a comparative view of processes for producing development frameworks and mandate policies in Malawi and Tanzania.

Table 3: A comparative view of processes for the development of medium- and long-term development frameworks versus manifesto development processes in Malawi and Tanzania.

	MALAWI	TANZANIA
Long-term vision and medium-term development frameworks process	- Procedural - Consultative at various levels - Involved experts. - Led by National Economic Council - Had pool of knowledge base - Involved in the development, implementation and evaluation of short-term, medium-term, and long-term plans to achieve the Vision.	- Procedural - Consultative, People's participation through symposia, interviews and dialogue with various groups, and meetings with people from various social settings in society. - Involved a Team of Experts - Involved mass media: articles and features in newspapers, debates and discussions in radio and television programmes
Manifesto process	- Smaller teams develop ideas for the manifesto and sell the same to the general supporters. - The task team considers the ministries that might be required to fulfil their standing agenda. - Ideas are further reorganized by task teams, bureaucrats, current and former, - Owned by party's governing body and later sold to the constituency. - Manifestos kept a secret for fear of theft of ideas. - Rarely consult grassroots	- Generally, elite cadres get involved. - Hold conferences to discuss ideas but due to resource constraints, these are rare. - The ruling party use its 10 cell level structures to get people's preferences. - Questionable level of engagement with locals, especially for those parties formed after multiparty democracy. - CCM has resources and deterministic tradition due to dictates of the ideology will often feedback and views solicited constantly through regular conferences and conventions not just when producing manifestos but at those levels

Source: Interviews and literature (Nyaluke and Conolly, 2013; URT, 2016, NEC, 2000).

Despite weak and exclusive formulation processes for mandate policies in Malawi, political mandates have dominated and obscured the development frameworks. The Malawi 2020 vision was effectively forgotten and only got referred to in name in policy documents during its lifetime. MGDS III raised this concern as follows:

Party manifestos have not been developed based on interpreting the national vision as enshrined in Vision 2020 but rather based on designing populist pet programmes that can deliver on votes.

MGDS III, 2017-2022, Page 41

The fact that in its entire 20-year period vision 2020 was only reviewed towards its expiry in 2019 speaks volumes on its usefulness to the political regimes. The review was done to aid the formulation of the new vision.

The Public Sector Investment Plan (PSIP) is used as a screening mechanism to verify that the projects being funded by the national development budget are in line with national development priority areas in midterm plans (MG, 2017). The Directorate of development planning confirmed that development management has used multiple tools for planning and implementing development since the multiparty system was adopted. The directorate is charged with:

... managing the Public Sector Investment Programme (PSIP) as a five-year programme that is used to plan both government and donor programmes.

23 September 2018, Capitol Hill Lilongwe.

The idea of having a PSIP is to enhance the proper programming of development projects in Malawi. This entails that the budget will also be based on the medium-term development plan priority areas. Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) becomes a tool for transparent and accountable preparation and management of the budget to ensure efficient and effective allocation of scarce resources in 'line with national priorities while achieving overall fiscal discipline.' The economic policy department mentioned the budget policy framework paper as a guiding document on 'how the next budget will look like.' The key informant further elaborates that:

Prior to the completion of the budget, the Minister makes pre-budget consultations to get views from the public on what should go into the budget.

23 September 2018, Capitol Hill Lilongwe.

Though the informant admits that this process is mostly formal as consultations are made in major cities in places where only the elite can attend, the process can be more consultative than the manifesto production process. The Minister of Finance will get priorities from the cabinet that will then guide most of the budget framework. The decisions by the cabinet will mostly be based on their

political priorities first (Brady, 1999). Policies prioritized in the electoral manifesto of the ruling party therefore have better chances of getting prioritized in the budget (Brouard, 2018). This makes established structures and processes for funding policy implementation useless in the face of political manifestos.

In Tanzania, there are indications that the vision and five-year development plans are being pursued though with less vigour. A former civil servant indicated that unlike Malawi, Tanzania's long-term plan was revitalized following the midterm review in 2009, and current plans and policies are aligned with this vision. The remaining period for implementing Vision 2025 was actually divided into 5-year fixed periods with themes and specific targets to ensure compliance as follows (URT, 2015): 2011/2-2015/6: 'promotion of economic growth by resolving the critical growth constraints' 2016/7-2020/1: 'industrialization' 2021/2-2025/6: 'attainment of competitiveness-driven export growth'.

The social protection paradigm has been so much associated with the "neoliberal market transactional logic" (IDS, 2011). Since the prescription of the SAPs policy influences from the Western donors have focused on social protection instruments to mitigate the impact of those SAPs on the economies of the SSA region (Dani, 2008; Holmqvist, 2009, cited in IDS, *ibid*). While appreciating the importance of PRSP frameworks (MKUKUTA I and II) that had social protection initiatives, Tanzania left them to the donors to control and produced a separate framework, the Five-Year Development Plans (FYDP) which they would fully control and prioritise (Urliksen, 2016). The change of personalities in the presidency in 2016 from Kikwete to Magufuli did not dilute but strengthened Tanzania's position on this. In Malawi, the propensity to implement shorter-term social protection and subsidy policies is noticeable in the contents of party manifestos. Medium to longer-term policies are deliberately neglected and no one has been able to tell what structure the next medium-term framework will take till they get there.

4.2.2. Agency influence

The existence of solid structures supported by more stable institutions and the Nyerere legacy in Tanzania has limited the space for maneuvering to contemporary leadership. More radical stands by Mwinyi and Kikwete as they adopted more capitalistic policies attracted a decline in party support while more conservative and technocratic performances from Mkapa and Magufuli increased support for the CCM party (Ngowi, 2009). Magufuli reasserted their socialist aspiration of self-determination and ventured into renegotiating trade terms with multinationals to reduce exploitation (Nyamsenda, 2018). Tanzanian leaders have been more consistent in pursuing medium- and long-term strategies in tune with the CCM party manifesto such that when a former civil servant was asked what motivates parties government to

implement Tanzania's Development Vision (TDV) and Five-Year Development Plans (FYDPs), his reply was:

It would appear awkward if parties did not follow the pathway because people seem to be aware that 'we should not be where we are' and this is forcing politicians not to go other ways.

Dar es Salam, July 2019

In Malawi, leadership has been influenced by the need to get in office and get reelected within an environment where parties feel insecure. As noted by Levi (1988), regimes facing imminent threats to their hold on power often have shorter time horizons as their priority will be survival. All leaders in the multiparty era have not attempted to make policies that pose risks to their re-election apart from Bingu Wa Mutharika who even reversed major strategies like the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and introduced MGDS risking donor support (Mwangonde & Mwakilama, 2017). Upon taking overpower from Muluzi in 2004 he abandoned the famous donor backed (PRSP) to formulate the growth-oriented Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGS) which upon pressure from donors combined with the social elements of the PRSP in 2006 to become the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS). Just like the FYDPs, MEGS was more economically oriented while the latter combined with the social elements (ibid). The rest of the leaders in the multiparty era have shown less resolve on the social-economic front.

A respondent from the monitoring and evaluation section of the DEP&D observed the following on the formulation and implementation of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS I):

The MGDS I has been the most commended in our evaluations for consistency in its implementation and this is because it was Bingu's own brainchild and not imposed from outside and he had the political will to see it succeed.

An official from DEP&D, Capitol Hill 23 September 2018

4.3. Subsidy Policies in Malawi and Tanzania

The model on policy determinants in the theoretical section above shows that a substantial number of competing parties in a fragmented system, focus on appealing to narrow constituencies. The provision of public goods is not of much priority, faced with the need to push for election or re-election (Sartori 1976, pp. 119-216; Linz and Stepan 1978, pp. 24-27). Examples of shorter-term policies examined in this article are handouts in the form of subsidies in social sectors. Subsidies in Malawi are provided through programmes like health, and education; social protection like public works programmes, cash transfers, and food and in-kind

transfers; and economic programmes in the areas of agriculture and trade (NSSP, 2012). Some of these subsidies are direct while others are indirectly provided. Respondents in the Department of Economic Planning and Development identified the following as some of the notable more direct subsidy programmes in Malawi at the time of this study: Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP); Public Works Programme; Decent and Affordable Housing Programme (DAHSP) and School Feeding Programme. There are also cash transfer programmes that are being rolled out throughout the country but most of them are led by the donors. Energy subsidies were in the recent past replaced by energy stabilization funds (Dionne & Horowitz, 2016). Amongst the subsidy programmes, FISP and DAHSP were initiated and dominantly funded by the Malawi government budget (Economic Planning and Development Officer interview, 2019).

A source in the Office of the President and cabinet mentioned other programmes that were introduced during the Joyce Banda era (2012-2014) like: 'one cow per family' where cows were distributed to rural households, and the Mudzi transformation project that constructed houses for the poor. These were prioritized within the period of Joyce Banda. Interestingly, immediately after she assumed office following the death of Bingu, she introduced the Economic Recovery Plan (ERP) as a development framework. The subsidy programmes mentioned above were not part of the ERP. One cow per family project was coordinated by the Presidential Initiative on Poverty and Hunger in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Mudzi transformation project was supposed to be a private undertaking under the Mudzi Transformation Trust and not designed to use government resources but was often mentioned as a government project during public rallies. 'Two crops per year through irrigation' was another of the small projects that were lined up. OPC respondent concluded that:

...and there are no evaluative reports of these projects after they were abandoned following Joyce Banda's loss of presidency in 2014.

OPC, Capitol Hill, 7 February 2020

One of the most notable characteristics of the subsidy policies introduced by politicians is discontinuity once the next government gains power. The mode of implementation of such projects does not guarantee accountability in the use of government funds which is why evaluations, or any type of reflective reviews are not often undertaken before the next government initiates their own.

In Tanzania, there was a low elite commitment to subsidies and social protection in the early 2000s. A respondent from REPOA had the following observation:

Subsidies that come as social assistance from the state are only invoked as a measure to respond to economic and social crises with most implemented as safety nets.

Dar es Salam, November 2019

There has been a shift towards concern for the vulnerable recently placing social protection on the policy agenda. With escalating levels of hunger in Tanzania, Agricultural input subsidy programmes were introduced in 2003 to increase production and make food available for the poor. The first subsidy came on transport costs and later seeds, pesticides, and herbicides in 2006 (Lameck, 2016; Isinika & Msuya, 2016). In 2007, the input subsidy programme was redesigned and upscaled to become the National Agricultural Input Voucher System programme (NAIVS). While donors assisted almost half of the resources for NAIVS unlike Malawi's FISP, other social protection programmes that the Tanzania government subsidized were mainly donor-supported programmes.

In the housing sector, subsidies have come through support for microfinance institutions to enable the financing of housing for low-income households. Other subsidies in the housing sector have targeted civil servants who, as observed by political experts in Dar es Salam:

..... have been given houses with a contract to convert them into their property after some years. Nothing for rural communities.

Dar es Salam, 28 July 2019

Lately, there have been promises of the construction of 30,000 affordable houses in accordance with the ruling CCAM manifesto with fewer results on the ground (Mwenda, 2019). Most significant was the Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) Programme, a nationwide conditional cash transfer programme that targeted the extremely poor population officially launched in 2012 (Ulriksen, 2016).

4.4. Discussion

This study has attempted to demonstrate that Malawi's competitive party system is a fragmented party system with a high number of parties that are not strong on ideological leanings. Tanzania's parties have a stronger ideological grounding that differentiates the parties and numbers competing at elections are relatively low qualifying it for a dominant party system. These systems became apparent following the transition to a multi-party system of government in the 1990s. Pre-transition

regimes in Malawi and Tanzania have been categorized as personal dictatorship and competitive one-party systems respectively by Bratton and Van Walle (1994). These scholars predicted that Malawi would transition into a fragmented party democracy owing to strong man rule that was exclusionary, disallowing competition while Tanzania with its inclusionary one-party system that had allowed limited competition within the party would transition into a dominant party system. Through analyzing a number of parties competing at elections, changes of ruling parties at elections, and distinct ideological leanings of political parties in the two countries, the prediction seems to have largely been fulfilled.

Democracy through such mechanisms as electoral competition is assumed to constrain politicians' and elites' behaviour (Besley & Case, 1995). However, what should be stressed as an essential element in constraining politicians' behavior is strong institutions. Elections alone may not constitute such institutions. These are consolidated over time. A dominant party system like Tanzania may have better institutions than Malawi as the arguments in chapters above have shown due to a long history of attempts at national building guided by agential power. Control of the transition to a multiparty system ensured that institutions were not so much interrupted. The continuation of rule by one party from independence has ensured stability in the policy arena.

A more competitive party system like Malawi lacks institutional strength due to several reasons including a history of antagonism between rulers and the ruled. The transition that changed the ruling regime also restructured institutions and with party fragmentation, the process of consolidating these institutions has been slow (Rakner; 2010). Competitiveness can therefore not be a guarantee for constraining politicians. It must be qualified. Implications of regime types on policy are outlined below.

Findings in this study support the Niles model on policy determinants in that a substantial number of competing parties in a fragmented system, represented by Malawi have focused on appealing to narrow constituencies. The provision of public goods is not of much priority, faced with the need to push for election or re-election (Sartori 1976, pp. 119-216; Linz and Stepan 1978, pp. 24-27). Dominant party systems like that of Tanzania will more likely have longer policy horizons than fragmented party systems like Malawi.




Figure 2: Model on Policy Determinants and Likelihood of Subsidy Adoption

Niles, 1999

In the dominant party system, Tanzania in the present study, the security of tenure of leaders is more assured and comparatively adopt longer time policy horizons. Some temporary subsidies and safety are implemented to a limit as a matter of maintaining political legitimacy and social control. The level of adoption of subsidies is lower than in fragmented systems. Stability and competitiveness, which both polities fall short of, will often be associated with polities where information flow between governments and voters is not an issue. And stability comes with stronger institutions.

Certainty of tenure of office for leadership coupled with competition to maintain a legacy of pioneer leaders seems to have fueled a lower propensity for policy short-termism in Tanzania as opposed to Malawi's hunger for the same. This article analyzed how mandate policies originating from party manifestos get synchronized with medium and long-term development frameworks in the two countries. Findings revealed that both countries have had medium to long-term plans and strategies that have been neglected at one time or another. Tanzania however, resuscitated its long-term plan around 2010 and reorganized its medium-term plans aligning them with Vision 2025 to support implementation of the latter while Malawi's long-term plan the vision 2020 went unnoticed for most of its lifetime (URT, 2015; NEC, 2000). A comparative analysis of the processes for coming up with development frameworks and mandate policies points towards assigning more credibility to development frameworks in both countries on both formulation and

implementation processes as they use standard procedures that are more inclusive than party processes while mandate policies are formulated by selected

members of the parties and where parties are short on institutionalization, they rarely go through normal consultative and vetting processes. The ruling CCM party in Tanzania was found to be the only party that is in touch with its structures and has a better chance of producing more credible mandate policies. This places CCM ahead of the other parties on the likelihood of producing mandate policies that would not be far from the laid down development frameworks.

While democracy theory gives space for parties to formulate their policies according to the preferences of their constituency, the assumption would be that the political market will be perfect. But Niles Matrix above shows that in fragmented democracies the cost of information flow is high unlike the 10-cell system characterizing CCM party structures. The imperfections in the political market in the developing world bring lower prospects for the formulation of policies with longer-term horizons as the search for votes gets more attention. The more stable medium- and long-term strategies would be appropriate tools to guide the country's longer-term development. However, the incentive structure in these fragmented polities does not push leadership in that direction as they have to survive in office first or find means to get in there. These defects in young democracies are part of the reasons Galenson and Schweinitz, (1959) blame democracy for the failure of development as they claim that it "unleashes pressures for immediate consumption, which occurs at the cost of investment, hence of growth".

'Pressures for immediate consumption' have manifested themselves as mandate policies. The increase in subsidy policies promised to the electorate in developing

democracies is an example. A scan through known government-led subsidies shows that there has been a re-emergence in both countries in the multiparty era. At every election, the numbers of subsidy promises are increasing in both countries. While promises increase in Tanzania, respondents claimed most of these promises do not get implemented as medium-term plans still dominate government activities. Amidst scarcity of resources, Malawi's ruling parties still promise more subsidy programmes. Some longer-term priorities in the medium to long-term development plans get neglected as annual budgets are under the control of ruling parties. Poverty eradication has been the justification for introducing subsidies in both countries as they target the poor, however, CCM Government has stressed growth-stimulating investment where poverty alleviation programmes are implemented (Gray & Khan, 2010). Despite many recommendations and offers of technical advice from various governmental and nongovernmental experts, the implementation of subsidies in Malawi seems to follow a predetermined route only understood by the drivers who are politicians (GOM, 2016).

5.0 Conclusion

From the above analysis, competition in a democracy is not an adequate force to constrain politicians' behaviour as that democracy has to be qualified. Institutions play a greater part in constraining this behaviour but various factors can make or unmake institutions and these include historical events that determine whether the policy space is stable or not, handling of transitions would also affect the stability of the policy space, grounding of party ideologies also contributes to this policy stability (Leftwich, 2007; North, 1990; Huntington, 1965; Levi, 1997). Lately, development frameworks have been introduced to assist in stabilizing development policy however, marriage between the development frameworks and mandate policy has to be considered as democracy tends to provide more space to the latter and the former has to rely on the mercy of the politician. Studies on policy and politics have therefore to consider many factors to reach better solutions to developmental jinxes and political economy factors of institutions, actors, and the politics thereof can be a good starting point.

6.0 Recommendations

Malawi's political system needs to reshape incentives for the institutionalization of political parties. The following would need to be considered to achieve this:

- Implementation of state funding for parties that obtain a substantive portion of the national vote.
- To reduce fragmentation and fluidity Malawi needs to strengthen its political party regulatory mechanism. One of these is the office of the

Registrar of political parties. Despite having the mandate to regulate, political influence has obscured its operations including disciplining ruling parties. It is instead used to punish only opposition parties. Parliament needs to insulate this office from political interference.

State institutions like the National Planning Commission (NPC) could collaborate with like-minded nonstate actors to push for more recognition and funding for longer-term development strategies by influencing parties to develop manifestos in line with the country's vision and 10-year plans. Much as the NPC has a legal mandate to force parties to do this, they need extra power and authority to enforce the same to parties including the ruling party. Such authority would also assist the network of organisations in following up on the implementation of such policies.

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